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COMBATING CLIMATE RECALCITRANCE: CARBONRELATED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS IN A NEW ERA
OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE
David A. C. Bullock†
Abstract: This article argues that carbon-related border tax adjustments
(“CRBTAs”) can be used effectively to complement the compliance mechanisms of the
Paris Agreement against a truly recalcitrant party. The soft enforcement mechanisms
envisioned by the Paris Agreement—facilitative assistance and political or moral
suasion—are unlikely to provide a sufficient response to a party that becomes truly
recalcitrant. CRBTAs provide parties to the Paris Agreement with a hard-edged economic
tool able to respond to a party that disavows the Paris regime. This article outlines the
features of a CRBTA regime that would be lawful under the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade and argues that the international political economy of the Paris Agreement
supports the development of complementary CRBTA measures. By situating a proposed
CRBTA regime in the multilateral context of the Paris Agreement, this article argues that
it is possible to overcome the political hurdles that have restrained states from unilaterally
adopting these measures. Finally, the Article posits that the Trump Administration has set
the United States on a course of recalcitrance that has increased the likelihood that CRBTA
measures may be deployed against the United States by other parties to the Paris
Agreement.
Cite as: David A. C. Bullock, Combating Climate Recalcitrance: Carbon-Related Border
Tax Adjustments in a New Era of Global Climate Governance, 27 WASH. INT’L L.J. 609
(2018).

I.

INTRODUCTION

There is a perplexing disconnect evidenced in the history of proposals
for carbon-related border tax adjustments (“CRBTAs”): border tax
adjustments designed to account for the effects of different states’ domestic
climate policies.1 While a sizable amount of literature has developed over the
last two decades discussing the design and legality of CRBTAs2—mostly
concluding that it is possible to fashion a measure that passes WTO muster—

†

LL.M. (Yale); LL.B. (Hons), B.C.A. (Victoria University of Wellington). I wish to thank Daniel
C. Esty for his comments and the assistance of the editors at the Washington International Law Journal.
Any remaining errors are my own.
1
Weber observes that the literature in this field adopts a range of terms in lieu of “border tax
adjustment” (including “carbon equalization measures,” “border adjustment measures,” or “border carbon
adjustments”) reflecting the possible misunderstanding that measures are limited to taxes applied at the
border. In fact, other fiscal measures can be used, and measures are not always applied at the border.
Nevertheless, in order to avoid further contributions to terminological soup, I use the term “border tax
adjustments” in this article, flagging these limitations. See Rolf H. Weber, Border Tax Adjustment – Legal
Perspective, 133 CLIMATIC CHANGE 407, 408 (2015).
2
This literature is reviewed infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text.
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no states have adopted these measures.3 Proposals for CRBTAs are frequently
identified as a means for supplementing proposed unilateral domestic efforts
to reduce greenhouse gas emissions in order to address environmental (carbon
leakage) or economic (competitiveness) concerns. The association of
CRBTAs with unilateral policy creates a nexus between academic and
political proposals for CRBTAs and dysfunction in international climate
governance negotiations. In the United States, for example, CRBTAs have
been a regular feature of proposed climate change legislation, serving as a
politically expedient answer to the competitiveness concerns of energyintensive and trade-exposed industries,4 albeit without ultimate legislative
success.5
In a world order characterized by sovereign nation-states, an effective
multilateral agreement that addresses a problem of global concern like climate
change requires a “‘thick’ global consensus” on the course to be taken.6
Global consensus has proved difficult to achieve, giving rise to arguments that
CRBTAs should be used to support unilateral action on climate change.
However, the reluctance of states to employ CRBTAs suggests that such
measures may be an illusory alternative to consensus-based international
3

There are examples of subsidies being provided to trade exposed industries in a number of national
emissions trading regimes, such as the European Union Emissions Trading Scheme. These subsidies take
the form of free emissions unit allocation and engage the requirements of the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures. See, e.g., FELICITY DEANE, EMISSIONS TRADING AND WTO LAW: A GLOBAL
ANALYSIS 134 (2015). These subsidies, while affecting trade, are not CRBTAs because they are not applied
at the border. The subsidizing of participants of emissions trading regimes through the free allocation of
emissions units is beyond the scope of this article, which focuses on border measures.
4
Ian Sheldon, Is There Anything New about Border Tax Adjustments and Climate Policy?, 93 AMER.
J. AGR. ECON. 553, 553 (2011); BRIAN P. FLANNERY, CARBON TAXES, TRADE, AND BORDER TAX
ADJUSTMENTS, RFF POLICY BRIEF NO. 16–02 (2016), http://www.rff.org/files/document/file/RFF-PB-1602.pdf.
5
See, e.g., Robert C. Means, The Climate Policy Landscape, 4 WAKE FOREST J. L. & POL’Y 319, 321
(2014) (outlining the history facing the Obama Administration’s attempts to enact climate change legislation
including the Waxman-Markey Bill). Proposals to deploy CRBTAs in connection with unilateral emissions
reduction policy are not limited to the United States. Similar proposals were also discussed in connection
with the Australian Clean Energy Package and the European Union Emissions Trading System. See, e.g.,
Felicity Deane, The Border Adjustments of the Australian Clean Energy Package, 17 INT’L TRADE & BUS.
L. REV. 29 (2014); Harro van Asselt & Thomas Brewer, Addressing Competitiveness and Leakage Concerns
in Climate Policy: An Analysis of Border Adjustment Measures in the US and the EU, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 42,
47–49 (2010).
6
Thom Brooks, Climate Change Justice Through Taxation?, 133 CLIMATIC CHANGE 419, 424
(2015). The idea of “thick consensus” can be contrasted with “thin consent” in that it involves normative
and norm-making content that includes broader values concepts derived from outside international law. See,
e.g., Joost Pauwelyn, Ramses A. Wessel & Jan Wouters, When Structures become Shackles: Stagnation and
Dynamics in International Lawmaking, 25 EUR. J. INT’L L. 733, 749 (2014). The normative content of “thick
consensus” can have a transformative effect on non-law, giving it legal effects. See JOOST PAUWELYN,
RAMSES WESSEL & JAN WOUTERS, Informal International Lawmaking: An Assessment and Template to Keep
It Both Effective and Accountable, in INFORMAL INTERNATIONAL LAWMAKING 500, 534 (2012).

June 2018

Combating Climate Recalcitrance

611

agreement. The effective implementation of CRBTAs, or other climatefocused trade measures, require a similar level of global consensus.7
While CRBTA proposals have been common in the context of
unilateral climate change policy, they rarely feature in academic or political
discussions of multilateral climate action.8 The absence of CRBTA proposals
connected to multilateral instruments supports an argument that states view
CRBTAs as a second-best option—normatively and practically—that requires
overcoming no fewer obstacles than achieving multilateral agreement itself.9
This Article argues that CRBTAs can complement and support a multilateral
climate governance regime such as the 2015 Paris Agreement10 when backed
by the consensus demonstrated through the adoption of the Agreement. The
argument made here diverges from the existing literature. It does so by
situating CRBTAs alongside a multilateral climate change agreement in order
to support the integrity of the regime created by the agreement itself, rather
than to support domestic policy adopted in furtherance of it.11
How can CRBTAs support the Paris Agreement? The answer lies in
the soft compliance mechanisms of the Agreement embodying facilitative,
non-punitive, and non-adjudicative features.12 The Paris Agreement operates
7

PAUWELYN ET AL., supra note 6, at 534.
Trade measures have been used in multilateral environmental agreements, typically in the form of
trade bans or quotas on particular goods. Examples include the Convention on the International Trade in
Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, the Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and their Disposal, and the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete
the Ozone Layer. These measures have taken the form of quantitative restrictions on trade and are made
possible by the limited original and application of the regulated goods, and their easy detectability and
substitutability. The characteristics of greenhouse gases—ubiquitous and economically significant—make
similar quantitative measures infeasible. See Duncan Brack, The Use of Trade Measures in the Montreal
Protocol, in PROTECTING THE OZONE LAYER: LESSONS, MODELS, AND PROSPECTS 99, 103–04 (Philippe G.
Le Prestre, John D. Reid & E. Thomas Morehouse, Jr. eds., 1998).
9
Brooks, supra note 6, at 420. Others have argued that CRBTAs are the second best option relative
to the outright transnational integration of climate change policies. See Douglas A. Kysar & Bernadette A.
Meyler, Like a Nation State, 55 UCLA L. REV. 1621, 1633 (2008).
10
Paris Agreement regarding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, opened
for signature Apr. 22, 2016, T.I.A.S. 16-1104 [hereinafter Paris Agreement]; United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change, Mar. 21, 1994, 1771 U.N.T.S. 107 [hereinafter UNFCC].
11
The limited literature that has considered CRBTAs in connection with the Paris Agreement has
focused on their ability to support domestic or regional climate action, rather than the Paris regime itself.
See, e.g., Julien Bueb, Lilian Richieri Hanania & Alice Le Clézio, Border Adjustment Mechanisms: Elements
for Economic Legal, and Political Analysis 3 (U.N. Univ. World Inst. for Dev. Econ. Research, Working
Paper No. 20, 2016), https://www.wider.unu.edu/sites/default/files/wp2016-20.pdf; Susanne Droege et al.,
The Trade System and Climate Action: Ways Forward Under the Paris Agreement 40–44 (Oct. 2016)
(working paper), http://climatestrategies.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/10/Trade-and-climate-ways-forward1.pdf; FLANNERY, supra note 4.
12
Christina Voigt, The Compliance and Implementation Mechanism of the Paris Agreement, 25
RECIEL 161, 161 (2016).
8
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using a “push-pull” system of enforcement. Some states might be unable to
achieve their nationally determined contributions (“NDCs”) because they lack
the financial means or technological resources to do so. Facilitative assistance
pulls underperforming states toward their contributions through the targeted
provision of resources to states in need. Alternatively, states may show a lack
of ambition in setting or meeting their NDCs, despite having the capacity, or
historical or moral responsibility to do more. Other parties or non-state actors
may form the view that such a state needs to try harder, and may exert political
or moral suasion to push the state toward increased ambition. Both elements
of the Paris “push-pull” model are, however, soft mechanisms. States do not
face hard legal sanctions under the Paris Agreement for failure to comply with
their obligations or to achieve their NDCs (which are not legal obligations
under the Agreement).
The Paris Agreement’s soft enforcement mechanisms are likely to be
lacking where a party to the Agreement becomes truly recalcitrant13—that is,
unrepentantly breaches its obligations or acts in a way that evidences a clear
disregard for, or implicit retraction of, its NDCs through its domestic policy
or international actions.14 Since the election of President Trump, the United
States’ conduct to undermine the Paris Agreement can be characterized as
recalcitrant. This conduct is addressed in detail below.
A recalcitrant state, having made a political calculus to effectively
abandon the Paris regime, is unlikely to be affected by political or moral
suasion and is an unsuitable candidate for facilitative assistance. The
international response to such a state must take a harder form to be politically
salient. This Article argues that coordinated CRBTAs imposed by the parties
to the Paris Agreement can support and complement the Agreement when
faced with a recalcitrant party.
Part II begins with a discussion of the challenges to governing the
climate and the states’ efforts to do so at the global level. The “global
In their assessment of human rights violations in the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea, Kirby
and Gopalan use the term “‘recalcitrant’ states” as a synonym for states that are “rogue,” “renegade,”
“outcast,” or “deviant.” See Michael Kirby & Sandeep Gopalan, ‘Recalcitrant’ States and International
Law: The Role of the UN Commission of Inquiry on Human Rights Violations in the Democratic People’s
Republic of Korea, 37 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 229, 234 (2015). The term as I use it in this article emphasizes
concepts of deviance, defiance and the renegade to convey a willful departure from the community
expectations established in the Paris Agreement.
14
Recalcitrance may also be exhibited by a state’s failing to become or remain a party to the Paris
Agreement, depending on the circumstances of the state in question.
13
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commons” nature of the climate system is problematic for both multilateral
governance and the trade system. Part III proceeds to consider the regime
governing border tax adjustments (“BTAs”) under the General Agreement on
Tariffs and Trade (“GATT”) before assessing the challenges of developing
and implementing a CRBTA. Part IV develops the argument that CRBTAs
can be effectively deployed to supplement the enforcement provisions of the
Paris Agreement in the case of a truly recalcitrant party. The argument is
situated in the context of the contemporary international political economy of
the international climate governance regime following the election of
President Trump in the United States. This Article poses that the Trump
Administration has set the United States on a recalcitrant course. The article
concludes by highlighting a new role for CRBTAs as a complement, rather
than an alternative, to multilateral agreement on global climate governance.
II.

THE CHALLENGES OF GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE

A majority of climate scientists have concluded that human activity
since the industrial revolution has had an unprecedented effect on the global
climate system.15 Industrial processes, transport, electricity generation, and
intensified agriculture have contributed to increasing concentrations of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere and an increase in the Earth’s average
surface temperature.16 The scientific consensus is that the rapid reduction of
anthropogenic emissions of greenhouse gases is necessary in order to avoid
dangerous interference with the climate system. 17 Further increases in
atmospheric greenhouse gases are likely to lead to increased surface
temperature, rising sea levels, drought, desertification, more frequent and
intense storms, and ocean acidification.18
The atmospheric system can be characterized as a “global commons”19:
an open access resource that every person on earth can use as a sink to store
the carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases emitted as an incident of daily
15

See generally INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2014:
SYNTHESIS REPORT (R.K. Pachauri & L.A. Meyer eds., 2014), http://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/syr/.
16
INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE, CLIMATE CHANGE 2013: THE PHYSICAL
SCIENCE BASIS 13–14 (Thomas F. Stocker et al. eds., 2013).
17
Id. at 27–29.
18
Id. at 20–27.
19
For an early use of this description in connection with the climate, see generally WILLIAM D.
NORDHAUS, MANAGING THE GLOBAL COMMONS: THE ECONOMICS OF CLIMATE CHANGE (1994); ORAN R.
YOUNG, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE: PROTECTING THE ENVIRONMENT IN A STATELESS SOCIETY (1994).
The origin of the description of open access resources as “commons” can be traced to Garrett Hardin’s oftcited article. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
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life in the industrialized world.20 Managing the global commons presents a
“super wicked” policy problem of unprecedented scale, cost, and
complexity.21 The fraught efforts of the global community to develop and
agree upon a regime to govern the climate system are a consequence of the
complexity of the problem.22 The challenge of managing global climate
change cannot be seen in isolation from other global challenges including the
management of the international economic system23 and public health.24
A.

Initial Attempts at Climate Governance by International
Agreement

The global effort to manage the effects of human activity on the climate
system is founded on the 1992 United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (“UNFCCC”).25 The UNFCCC established a set of guiding
principles toward the overall goal of avoiding dangerous anthropogenic
climate change.26 The Kyoto Protocol was the world community’s first
attempt to implement action towards the goals established in the UNFCCC.27
The Protocol established a strongly bifurcated model of obligations,
embodying a strong principle of common but differentiated responsibilities.28
Only countries listed in an Annex I to the Protocol—primarily developed
countries—had obligations to reduce emissions.29 Emissions reduction
20

The commons nature of the atmosphere derives not only from its function as a sink for greenhouse
gases but also from, for example, it being the source of breathable air (and the location for particulate air
pollution) and an area for transportation using aircraft and the transmission of radio waves. See, e.g., MARVIN
S. SOROOS, THE ENDANGERED ATMOSPHERE: PRESERVING A GLOBAL COMMONS (1997). Nor is the
atmosphere the only sink for greenhouse gases; other sinks include terrestrial systems (such as forests) and
oceans. See, e.g., Corinne Le Quéré, Michael R. Raupach, Josep G. Canadell & Gregg Marland, Trends in
the Sources and Sinks of Carbon Dioxide, 2 NATURE GEOSCIENCE 831 (2009).
21
Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to
Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 1153 (2009).
22
For detailed accounts of the early phases of international climate negotiations, see Joyeeta Gupta, A
History of International Climate Change Policy, 1 WIRES CLIMATE CHANGE 636 (2010) (examining the
history of international climate change process across five periods); Daniel Bodansky, The History of the
Global Climate Change Regime, in INT’L RELATIONS AND GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 23 (Urs Luterbacher
& Detlef F. Sprinz eds., 2001).
23
See, e.g., Joseph E. Stiglitz, A New Agenda for Global Warming, in THE ECONOMISTS’ VOICE: TOP
ECONOMISTS TAKE ON TODAY’S PROBLEMS 22 (Joseph E. Stiglitz, Aaron S. Edlin & J. Bradford DeLong
eds., 2006).
24
See, e.g., A. Haines et al., Climate Change and Human Health: Impacts, Vulnerabilities and Public
Health, 120 PUB. HEALTH 585 (2006).
25
UNFCC, supra note 10.
26
Id. art. 2.
27
Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997,
U.N. Doc FCCC/CP/1997/7/Add.1, 37 I.L.M. 22 (1998).
28
Id. art. 10.
29
Id. art. 3(1).
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obligations took the form of legally binding targets that were negotiated and
agreed by the parties.30
The United States played a leading role in the framing and negotiation
of the Kyoto Protocol.31
However, the principle of differentiated
responsibilities embodied in the Protocol made ratification of the agreement
in the United States politically unachievable.32 Legislators were unwilling to
risk domestic costs associated with emission-reduction actions when other
major economies, like China, did not have emission-reduction targets under
the agreement.33 Nevertheless, the Protocol entered into force in 2005
following ratification by other major Annex I emitters: the European Union,
Russia, and Japan.
It was clear that any post-Kyoto agreement needed to include the United
States and China—the world’s two largest emitters—if the UNFCCC goal of
avoiding dangerous anthropogenic climate change were to be achieved.34 The
prospects of a grand climate agreement appeared to be slim after the collapse
of negotiations in Copenhagen, where the focus had been on agreeing to a
post-Paris framework.35 However, the compromises achieved at Copenhagen
sowed the seeds for the new model eventually adopted at Paris.36 Moreover,
much of the blame for the failure at Copenhagen was attributed to China, and
China came to regard the narrative around Copenhagen with frustration and

30

Id. art. 4(1).
Michael Zammit Cutajar, Reflections on the Kyoto Protocol: Looking Back to See Ahead, 5 INT’L
REV. FOR ENVTL. STRATEGIES 61, 63 (2004).
32
Byrd-Hagel Resolution, S. Res. 98, 105th Cong. (1997) (enacted).
33
See, e.g., Letter from President George W. Bush to Senators Hagel, Helms, Craig, and Roberts (Mar.
13,
2001),
https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2001/03/20010314.html
(announcing that the United States would be formally withdrawing from the Protocol on the grounds that it
“exempts 80 percent of the world, including major population centers such as China and India, from
compliance, and would cause serious harm to the US economy. The Senate's vote, 95-0, shows that there is
a clear consensus that the Kyoto Protocol is an unfair and ineffective means of addressing global climate
change concerns.”).
34
See G. Marland, T.A. Boden, and R.J. Andres, Global, Regional, and National Fossil-Fuel
CO2 Emissions: Top 20, CARBON DIOXIDE INFO. ANALYSIS CTR. (2009), http://cdiac.essdive.lbl.gov/trends/emis/overview.html.
35
See, e.g., William Boyd, Climate Change, Fragmentation, and the Challenges of Global
Environmental Law: Elements of a Post-Copenhagen Assemblage, 32 U. PA. J. INT’L L. 457 (2009).
36
Daniel Bodansky, The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem, 104 AM. J. INT’L
L. 230, 239 (2010) (observing that “the participating states did agree to a bottom-up process in which they
will list their national actions internationally and subject their actions to some form of international scrutiny”
and identifying this as one of the ways in which Copenhagen was a “potentially significant breakthrough” in
international climate negotiations).
31
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as a foreign relations disappointment.37 Spurred by domestic concerns about
environmental air quality and energy security, China enhanced its domestic
emission-reduction efforts and began to take a more active leadership role on
the international stage.38 China’s new interest in climate action culminated in
a series of joint statements issued by the presidents of China and the United
States. The presidents expressed their intentions to significantly reduce
greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, China announced a nationwide
rollout of its emissions trading system pilots.39 The joint China-United States
statements were made in the shadow of the meeting of the conference of the
parties in Paris and proved to be a key catalyst in producing the agreement
ultimately reached.40
B.

The Push and Pull of the Paris Agreement

Paris produced a unique agreement designed to accommodate the
special challenges of the global climate system by balancing three principles
of effectiveness: participation, ambition and compliance.41 The balance
manifested in a “hybrid” architecture, relying on self-determined state
ambition through non-binding emissions reduction targets.42 The selfdetermined flexibility of the agreement was created by binding procedural
obligations designed to encourage (rather than require) goal achievement, and
to result in a progressive increase in ambition over time. The Paris regime
can be contrasted with the strong, binding, “top-down” obligations of the
Kyoto Protocol.43 States appear to have been receptive to this new flexible
governance model—the Agreement received a sufficient level of ratification

Björn Conrad, China in Copenhagen: Reconciling the “Beijing Climate Revolution” and the
“Copenhagen Climate Obstinacy,” 210 CHINA Q. 435, 453 (2012).
38
See, e.g., Ross Garnaut, China’s Role in Global Climate Change Mitigation, 22 CHINA & WORLD
ECON. 2 (2014); Peter Christoff, The Promissory Note: COP 21 and the Paris Climate Agreement, 25 ENVTL.
POL. 765, 771 (2016).
39
Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary of The White House, U.S.-China Joint Announcement
on Climate Change (Nov. 11, 2014), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2014/11/11/uschina-joint-announcement-climate-change; Press Release, Office of the Press Secretary of The White House,
U.S.-China
Joint
Presidential
Statement
on
Climate
Change
(Sept.
25,
2015),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/the-press-office/2015/09/25/us-china-joint-presidential-statementclimate-change.
40
Daniel Bodansky, The Paris Climate Change Agreement: A New Hope?, 110 AM. J. INT’L L. 288,
293 (2016); Radoslav S. Dimitrov, The Paris Agreement on Climate Change: Behind Closed Doors, GLOBAL
ENVTL. POL., Aug. 2016, at 9.
41
Voigt, supra note 12, at 161.
42
See Bodansky, supra note 40, at 301.
43
Id. at 289–90.
37

June 2018

Combating Climate Recalcitrance

617

to enter into force less than a year after negotiations were concluded.44
Importantly, major emitting states including the United States, China and
India were parties to the Agreement.
The Paris Agreement represents states’ desires to coordinate their
actions and signal a willingness to cooperate without formally binding
themselves to achieve substantive targets. The legally-binding aspects of the
Agreement are largely procedural, governing NDC-setting and
communication, accounting, and transparency (monitoring, verification, and
reporting).45 The Agreement contains a “compliance mechanism” as part of
its “enhanced transparency framework.”46 Enhancement comes in the form
of the provision of support to parties and its account of their different
capabilities. The transparency mechanisms are to be implemented in a
“facilitative, non-intrusive, non-punitive manner, respectful of national
sovereignty, and [are to] avoid placing undue burden on the Parties.”47 The
compliance mechanism in Article 15 uses similar language, providing for an
expert-based committee that serves a facilitative role and functions in a
manner “that is transparent, non-adversarial and non-punitive.”48
Through its enhanced transparency and compliance mechanisms, the
Paris Agreement is designed to move states toward their goals using a system
of pulls and pushes.49 The Agreement’s regime of pushes and pulls trades in

44
U.N. Secretary-General, Paris Agreement, Entry Into Force, U.N. Doc. C.N.735.2016.TREATIESXXVII.7.d (Depositary Notification) (Oct. 5, 2016).
45
Daniel Bodansky, The Legal Character of the Paris Agreement, 25 RECIEL 142, 143 (2016);
Sebastian Oberthür & Ralph Bodle, Legal Form and Nature of the Paris Outcome, 6 CLIMATE L. 40, 49
(2016).
46
Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13, 15.
47
Id. art. 13(3).
48
Id. art. 15.
49
A regime of pushes and pulls, or “carrots and sticks,” was also used in the Montreal Protocol on
Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer by combining sticks (trade restrictions on ozone depleting
substances) and carrots (financial assistance and technology transfer). See ZhongXiang Zhang, Multilateral
Trade Measures in a Post-2012 Climate Change Regime?: What Can Be Taken From the Montreal Protocol
and the WTO?, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 5105, 5109 (2009). However, credible “sticks” come at a cost to those
wielding them. While the experiences of the Montreal Protocol can provide opportunities for learning it
cannot be taken for granted that “sticks” bear the same economic cost in different contexts. It is therefore
necessary to consider the climate change regime separately from the Montreal Protocol in order to determine
whether there is an economic case for the trade “sticks” proposed. See Scott Barrett, Montreal versus Kyoto:
International Cooperation and the Global Environment, in GLOBAL PUBLIC GOODS: INTERNATIONAL
COOPERATION IN THE 21ST CENTURY 192, 193 (Inge Kaul, Isabelle Grunberg & Marc Stern eds., 1999)
(arguing that the different costs of implementing sticks means that the Montreal Protocol cannot simply be
used as a template for international climate governance).
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a currency of “political leadership, financial assistance and moral suasion.”50
The enhanced transparency regime uses monitoring, reporting, and
verification to identify states that are falling behind as a result of their
capabilities. The information obtained through the transparency mechanism
can be used to pull these states toward their NDCs by facilitating assistance
in the form of targeted financial assistance, technology transfer, and
opportunities for cooperation.
The enhanced transparency mechanism also serves an important
informal enforcement function. Monitoring, reporting, and verification reveal
performance, enabling the identification of states that show a lack of ambition
in setting or meeting their NDCs, despite having the capacity or responsibility
to do more. Other parties51 or non-state actors52 may form the view that such
a state needs to try harder, and may exert peer pressure in the form of political
or moral suasion to push the state toward increased ambition.53 When a party
is identified and denounced as out of line with community expectations, a
burden is placed on domestic actors in the targeted state. Those actors are
expected to bring their behavior in line with community expectations by
becoming aware of an inadvertent failure to achieve those expectations,54
accepting the normative legitimacy of that assessment,55 seeking to avoid
reputational harm,56 or becoming accustomed to the expressed norms.57
It should be noted that contrasting views exist on the scope and effect
of many parts of the Paris Agreement.58 Other, bolder interpretations of the

Robert Falkner, The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of International Climate Politics, 92 INT’L
AFF. 1107, 1124 (2016).
51
Id. at 1121.
52
Harro van Asselt, The Role of Non-State Actors in Reviewing Ambition, Implementation, and
Compliance under the Paris Agreement, 6 CLIMATE L. 91 (2016).
53
M. J. Mace, Mitigation Commitments under the Paris Agreement and the Way Forward, 6 CLIMATE
L. 21, 36 (2016).
54
See, e.g., ABRAM CHAYES & ANTONIA HANDLER CHAYES, THE NEW SOVEREIGNTY: COMPLIANCE
WITH INTERNATIONAL REGULATORY AGREEMENTS 22 (2009).
55
See generally THOMAS M. FRANCK, FAIRNESS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW AND INSTITUTIONS (1995);
T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Transnational Spaces: Norms and Legitimacy, 33 YALE J. INT’L L. 479, 489 (2008).
56
Andrew T. Guzman, A Compliance-Based Theory of International Law, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1823, 1847
(2002).
57
See, e.g., Harold Hongju Koh, Why Do Nations Obey International Law?, 106 YALE L.J. 2599, 2646
(1997); Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States: Socialization and International Human
Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
58
Jorge E. Viñuales et al., Climate Policy after the Paris 2015 Climate Conference, 17 CLIMATE POL’Y
1, 1 (2017).
50
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Paris Agreement have been advanced. Voigt and Ferreira,59 for example,
argue that the Agreement imposes substantive obligations on parties to take
action to achieve their emissions reduction goals because under Article 4(2)
“each party is committed to taking all appropriate and adequate climate
measures in order to progressively achieve the objective of the Agreement.”60
However, this argument overstates the effect of Article 4(2), which only
requires parties to “aim at achieving the objectives of their contributions.”
The difference between the requirements of the Paris Agreement and Voigt
and Ferreira’s claim is subtle, but important. First, parties have only
committed to using their highest possible ambition in their goal setting (that
is, in setting their NDCs), not in their action.61 Second, the parties have
committed only to achieve the “objectives” of their goals.62 The textual
limitation of the parties’ obligation to achieve the “objectives” of their NDCs,
rather than the achievement of the NDCs themselves, must be given
meaning.63 The better view is that Article 4(2) is not an obligation of result64
and stops short of committing parties to actually achieve their contributions65
or to implement specific domestic policies to that end.66
C.

Recalcitrant Parties and CRBTAs

The soft enforcement mechanisms of the Paris Agreement might work
to push states that lack the capabilities needed to achieve their NDCs, or states
that need to be pushed to meet community expectations but that are
fundamentally on board with the global climate governance project. But what
about parties that come to reject the regime established by the Paris
Agreement and wish to walk away from their obligations and NDCs? Such a
move is not without precedent. In the face of international protests, Canada
opted to withdraw from the Kyoto Protocol when it became clear it would not
meet its obligations.67 More recently, President Trump has announced that
59
Christina Voigt & Felipe Ferreira, ‘Dynamic Differentiation’: The Principles of CBDR-RC,
Progression and Highest Possible Ambition in the Paris Agreement, 5 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 285, 302
(2016).
60
Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 4(2).
61
Id. art. 4(3).
62
Id. art. 4(2).
63
See Bodansky, supra note 45, at 146.
64
Oberthür & Bodle, supra note 45, at 54.
65
Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and Differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative
Possibilities and Underlying Politics, 65 INT’L & COMP. L.Q. 493, 498 (2016).
66
Bodansky, supra note 45, at 146 (arguing that the use of the word “pursue” and “aim” tell against
any obligation to implement specific domestic mitigation measures).
67
See Jane Matthews Glenn & Jose Otero, Canada and the Kyoto Protocol: An Aesop Fable, in
CLIMATE CHANGE AND THE LAW 489, 489 (Erkki J. Hollo, Kati Kulovesi & Michael Mehling eds. 2012).
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the United States will withdraw from the Paris Agreement on the basis that
the terms of the agreement are unfavorable to the United States.68
Formal withdrawal from the Paris Agreement is possible, but it is not a
fast process. Article 28 of the Agreement provides that a state may withdraw
at any time after three years from the date on which the Agreement entered
into force, and such a withdrawal will take effect no earlier than one year from
notice of withdrawal.
A state that does not wish to wait may take advantage of the flexible
nature of the Agreement to “informally” withdraw by simply stepping back
from its mitigation efforts and limiting or ceasing its constructive participation
in the international process. The United States has announced that, despite
having given notice of its withdrawal from the Paris Agreement, it will
continue to participate in international climate change negotiations and
meetings.69 However, the State Department’s announcement on the subject
was clear that the United States’ continued participation would be
unabashedly for its own benefit, stating that its intent was “to protect U.S.
interests and ensure that all future policy options remain open to the
administration.”70 Consistent with its avowed national interest, the focus of
the United States’ delegation at COP23 changed from clean energy to
emphasizing coal and nuclear power, and the events the delegation held at the
COP reflected a focus on fossil fuel.71
A party to the Paris Agreement may exhibit its recalcitrance in a
number of specific ways. It may unrepentantly breach its procedural
obligations under the Agreement by failing to comply with monitoring,
reporting, and verification requirements,72 or by failing to ratchet up its
68

President Trump Announces U.S. Withdrawal from the Paris Climate Accord, WHITE HOUSE (June
1, 2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/president-trump-announces-u-s-withdrawal-paris-climateaccord/. A formal notice of withdrawal under Article 28 of the Paris Agreement has been deposited by the
United States. See U.N. Secretary-General, United States of America: Communication, C.N.464.2017TREATIES-XXVII.7.d
(Depositary
Notification)
(Aug.
8,
2017),
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CN/2017/CN.464.2017-Eng.pdf.
69
Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of State, Communication Regarding Intent to Withdraw from Paris
Agreement (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2017/08/273050.htm.
70
Id.
71
See, e.g., United States of America, MRI/NREL: The Role of More Efficient Fossil Fuels and Nuclear
Power in Climate Mitigation, U.N. CLIMATE CHANGE, https://cop23.unfccc.int/event/united-states-ofamerica-mri/nrel-the-role-of-cleaner-and-more-efficient-fossil-fuels-and-nuclear-0; see also Lisa Friedman,
Trump Team to Promote Fossil Fuels and Nuclear Power at Bonn Climate Talks, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/11/02/climate/trump-coal-cop23-bonn.html?_r=0.
72
Paris Agreement, supra note 10, art. 13.
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NDC.73 Alternatively, a party may exhibit an intention to abandon efforts to
achieve its NDC through its words or actions, including: refusing to
implement domestic policies to limit emissions, expanding emissionsintensive industries in a way inconsistent with the objective of its NDC, or
undermining international processes and initiatives. A state’s refusal to join
or remain a party to the Agreement could also be treated as recalcitrance,
depending on the circumstances of the state.74 The crucial distinction between
a party that is insufficiently ambitious and one that is recalcitrant is that the
former remains committed to the objective of the Paris Agreement and the
global climate governance project. No hard-and-fast criterion can be
established to define recalcitrance. As will be seen, whether a state’s behavior
is recalcitrant is ultimately a matter to be assessed by the community of parties
to the Paris Agreement.
The soft enforcement mechanisms of the Paris Agreement are illequipped to deal with recalcitrance, giving rise to potential problems for the
integrity of the new global climate governance project. Major emitting states
have repeatedly “shown themselves willing to accept a loss in international
reputation when domestic economic priorities have been at stake.”75 On these
occasions (such as the failure of the United States to ratify Kyoto, Canada’s
withdrawal from Kyoto, and the United States’ withdrawal from Paris), it is
important to observe that major emitters “not only chose domestic priorities
over international concerns but actively challenged the idea of internationally
agreed and legally binding emissions reduction targets.”76 Recalcitrance
involves not only the elevation of domestic interests but an active challenge
to the international project, making it unlikely that political or moral suasion
will be effective to change the behavior of such a state. A more tangible and
credible response is needed.
The remainder of the article argues that CRBTAs can be used
effectively and legally as a response to recalcitrant parties under the Paris
Agreement. In this way, CRBTAs can supplement the enforcement
provisions of the Paris Agreement by providing a measure with a harder edge
than those contained in the Agreement itself. The use of trade measures to
support climate action fits within the international climate governance regime.
73

Id. art. 4(3).
A state that has failed to sign or ratify the Agreement due to internal civil or political strife would
not be properly viewed as recalcitrant. The objective of the Agreement is better advanced through efforts to
provide states suffering internal disorder with facilitative assistance.
75
Falkner, supra note 50, at 1122.
76
Id.
74
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Article 3(5) of the UNFCCC provides that “measures taken to combat climate
change, including unilateral ones, should not constitute a means of arbitrary
or unjustifiable discrimination or a disguised restriction on international
trade.” This explicit link to the language of international trade law, and the
overlap between the parties to the Paris Agreement and the GATT, makes it
necessary to examine the compatibility of a CRBTA under the GATT, which
Part III of this Article proceeds to do. Part IV then draws the Paris Agreement
and CRBTAs together to argue that the use of CRBTAs provide a feasible and
effective response to recalcitrant parties to the Paris Agreement (including the
recent recalcitrant behavior of the United States).
III.

CARBON-RELATED BORDER TAX ADJUSTMENTS AND THE GATT

Some countries regulate greenhouse gas emissions more than others.
Differences in domestic climate change policy give rise to what is known as
“carbon leakage.” Carbon leakage is used to describe the movement of
emissions-intensive production toward states with no regulation, or lesser
regulation, of greenhouse gas emissions.77 The term is also used to describe
a fall in the price of fossil fuels as demand is reduced in states imposing carbon
regulations, leading to an increase in fossil fuel use, and thereby emissions, in
other states.78
The pathology of carbon leakage is twofold, giving rise to both an
environmental and an economic narrative.79 First, it obscures real gains in
emissions policy from those driven by transnational economic reorganization.
The fear of carbon leakage was particularly pervasive under the Kyoto
Protocol. The differentiation of parties into Annex 1 parties (which had
binding emission reduction targets) and non-Annex I parties (which had no
emission reduction targets) created incentives supporting a transfer of
emissions-intensive industry from developed states to industrialized
developing states. Economic reorganization associated with differential
climate change policy creates illusory emissions reductions in carbonregulated states by nominally reducing domestic emissions while continuing
to consume carbon-intensive products imported from states that do not
Mustafa H. Babiker, Climate Change Policy, Market Structure, and Carbon Leakage, 65 J. INT’L
ECON. 421, 422 (2005).
78
Joshua Elliott et al., Unilateral Carbon Taxes, Border Tax Adjustments and Carbon Leakage, 14
THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 207, 208 (2013).
79
Cf. MICHAEL TREBILCOCK, ROBERT HOWSE & ANTONIA ELIASON, THE REGULATION OF
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 661 (Routledge 4th ed. 2013) (asserting that these two arguments are in tension with
the basic theory of comparative advantage in trade law).
77
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regulate emissions. This environmental narrative has had particular resonance
in Europe.80
A second pathology hits domestic producers, who are forced to bear the
costs of local emissions-reduction policies while competing with imported
products produced in jurisdictions where manufacturers are not required to
internalize the cost of carbon. This economic narrative has resonated most
significantly in the United States, where legislators frequently have raised
concerns about the need to safeguard domestic industries and jobs, and
prevent freeriding by other major economies.81 It is this second pathology
where the interface between the world trading system and climate policy can
be seen most clearly as it bears particular political salience.82
A CRBTA is classically viewed as a response to the economic and
environmental pathologies of differential unilateral domestic emissionsreduction policies. The use of BTAs to resolve the effects of differential
regulation are not new or limited to the environmental context. 83 The core
logic behind a BTA is the principle of destination,84 which provides that goods
should be taxed in the country of consumption.85 A leveling of the playing
field may be achieved by applying a BTA to imports or exports. Imports may
be taxed at the border to reflect the taxes charged in the importing country on
like domestic products that are not replicated in the country of origin.
Similarly, tax rebates or subsidies may be provided for exported goods to
reflect the lack of equivalent taxes in the destination state.
A.

Assessing the Legality of CRBTAs under the GATT

There is well-developed literature on the technical legal hurdles that a
CRBTA regime would face under the GATT and other international trade

80

van Asselt & Brewer, supra note 5, at 49.
Id.
82
See, e.g., Robyn Eckersley, The Politics of Carbon Leakage and the Fairness of Border Measures,
24 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 367, 368 (2010).
83
See Paul Demaret & Raoul Stewardson, Border Tax Adjustments under GATT and EC Law and
General Implications for Environmental Taxes, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5, 7 (1994). Examples of border tax
adjustments can be found as far back as the 18th century, such as the Whiskey Act of 1791, which imposed
a federal tax on distilled spirits but rebated it on exports of whiskey. The use of border tax adjustments
became increasingly formalized into international agreements in the 19th century, enshrining their place in
international trade law.
84
Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, ¶ 4, GATT Doc. L/3464 (Nov. 20, 1970).
85
Id. ¶ 21.
81

624

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 3

regulations.86 This literature has gone through a number of phases. Early
literature developed shortly after the signature of the UNFCCC shifted focus
to the pervasive problem of climate change and other global environmental
challenges identified by the international community at Rio. In that context,
proposals for border taxes were raised by a number of jurisdictions, including
the United States, Japan, and the European Union.87
Further literature developed in the context of the 1997 Kyoto Protocol,
particularly in response to the United States’ concerns about a lack of formal
emission-reduction obligations on developing states88 and its subsequent nonparticipation in the Kyoto regime.89 The concept surfaced again in the context
of the fraught negotiations toward a post-Kyoto governance regime.90 For
86
See generally, e.g., DANIEL C. ESTY, GREENING THE GATT – TRADE, ENVIRONMENT, AND THE
FUTURE 168 (1994); Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 83; Marco Düerkop, Trade and Environment:
International Trade Law Aspects of the Proposed EC Directive Introducing a Tax on Carbon Dioxide
Emissions and Energy, 31 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 807 (1994); Markus Schlagenhof, Trade Measures Based
on Environmental Processes and Production Measures, 29 J. WORLD TRADE 123 (1995); Christian Pitschas,
GATT/WTO Rules for Border Tax Adjustment and the Proposed European Directive Introducing a Tax on
Carbon Dioxide Emissions and Energy, 24 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. 479 (1995); Raymond Clémençon,
Global Climate Change and the Trade System: Bridging the Culture Gap, 4 J. ENV’T & DEV. 29 (1995).
87
Pitschas, supra note 86, at 479–80.
88
See, e.g., ZhongXiang Zhang, Greenhouse Gas Emissions Trading and the World Trading System,
32 J. WORLD TRADE 219 (1998); Aaron Cosbey & James Cameron, Trade Implications of the Kyoto Protocol,
POLICY MATTERS (1999), http://search.iisd.org/pdf/2008/trade_imp_kyoto.pdf; Frank E. Loy, On a Collision
Course? Two Potential Environmental Conflicts Between the U.S. and Canada, 28 CAN.–U.S. L.J. 11, 18
(2002) (noting the possibility of a Canadian border tax adjustment vis-à-vis the United States to account for
the latter’s non-participation in the Kyoto Protocol); THOMAS L. BREWER, INTERNATIONAL TRADE, THE WTO
AND
INTERNATIONAL CLIMATE AGREEMENTS (2003), http://www.esri.go.jp/jp/prj/int_prj/prjrc/kankyou/kankyou14/02ceps.pdf.
89
See, e.g., Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm, Implementing the Kyoto Protocol without the USA: the
Strategic Role of Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 4 CLIMATE POL’Y 289 (2005); Gavin Goh, The
World Trade Organization, Kyoto and Energy Tax Adjustments at the Border, 38 J. WORLD TRADE 395
(2004). Much of this literature has focused on the ability to maintain the integrity of the European Union
Emissions Trading System in the face of a fragmented international climate regime. See, e.g., Javier de
Cendra, Can Emissions Trading Schemes be Coupled with Border Tax Adjustments? An Analysis vis-à-vis
WTO Law, 15 RECIEL 131 (2006); Roland Ismer & Karsten Neuhoff, Border Tax Adjustment: A Feasible
Way to Support Stringent Emission Trading, 24 EUR. J. L. ECON. 137 (2007); Harro van Asselt & Frank
Biermann, European Emissions Trading and the International Competitiveness of Energy-Intensive
Industries: A Legal and Political Evaluation of Possible Supporting Measures, 35 ENERGY POL’Y 497 (2007);
Reinhard Quick, ‘Border Tax Adjustment’ in the Context of Emission Trading: Climate Protection or ‘Naked’
Protectionism?, 3 GLOBAL TRADE & CUST. J. 163 (2008).
90
See, e.g., GARY C. HUFBAUER, STEVE CHARNOVITZ & JISUN KIM, GLOBAL WARMING AND THE
WORLD TRADING SYSTEM (2009); Ben Lockwood & John Whalley, Carbon-Motivated Border Tax
Adjustments: Old Wine in Green Bottles?, 33 WORLD ECON. 810 (2010); M. Benjamin Eichenberg,
Greenhouse Gas Regulation and Border Tax Adjustments: The Carrot and the Stick, 3 GOLDEN GATE U.
ENVT’L L.J. 283 (2010); Jon M. Truby, Towards Overcoming the Conflict Between Environmental Tax
Leakage and Border Tax Adjustment Concessions for Developing Counties, 12 VT. J. ENVT’L L. 149 (2010);
Charles E. McLure, The Carbon-Added Tax: An Idea Whose Time Should Never Come, 3 CARBON &
CLIMATE L. REV. 250 (2010); Kateryna Holzer, Proposals on Carbon-related Border Adjustments: Prospects
for WTO Compliance, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 51 (2010).
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example, a number of bills were put before the United States Congress that
would have imposed various trade measures had they been enacted.91 For the
most part, the literature on CRBTAs has recognized the possibility of creating
a legal measure, while at times questioning the practical feasibility and the
political or economic wisdom of such measures. CRBTAs should not be seen
separately from the existing literature on BTAs.92
The following subparts address the key legal hurdles facing a CRBTA
under the GATT. First, the principle of national treatment requires that
imported products be accorded no less favorable treatment than like domestic
products. Second, the principle of non-discrimination precludes states using
trade measures that discriminate on the basis of the national origin of a
product. Finally, the GATT contains a number of justifications that preserve
measures that would otherwise infringe primary obligations of the Agreement.
A lawful carbon-related border tax adjustment must accord with the principles
of national treatment and non-discrimination or fall within one of the
justifications provided. These issues are considered in turn.
B.

National Treatment

The requirement of national treatment under Article III of the GATT
prohibits discriminatory conduct—parties treating imported products less
favorably than “like” domestic products. Before considering the implications
of the national treatment requirement further, it is first necessary to elaborate
on the requirements of Article II of GATT, which provide a starting point for
the imposition of BTAs on imported products.
Article II(1) places a ceiling on the level of import duties that may be
imposed by requiring such duties to be no less favorable than those listed in
the relevant schedule of concessions.93 However, Article II(2)(a) provides
that, notwithstanding these ceilings, a state is not prevented from imposing a
charge that is “equivalent to an internal tax” in respect to either a “like
domestic product” or “in respect of an article from which the imported product
91

Valentina Durán Medina & Rodrigo Polanco Lazo, A Legal View on Border Tax Adjustments and
Climate Change: A Latin American Perspective, 11 SUSTAINABLE DEV. L. & POL’Y 29, 30–31 (2011). The
proposed United States measures included the Lieberman-Warner Climate Security Act of 2008, the Climate
Market Auction Trust and Trade Emissions Reduction System Act of 2008, and the American Clean Energy
and Security Act of 2009.
92
Lockwood & Whalley, supra note 90, at 815.
93
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade art. II(1), Oct. 30, 1947, 55 U.N.T.S. 194 [hereinafter
GATT].
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has been manufactured or produced in whole or in part.”94 A BTA will
normally adjust for indirect taxes (taxes levied on products) but not direct
taxes (taxes levied on individuals, not products), the logic being that indirect
taxes will usually be passed on to the consumer through the final purchase
price.95
In order to be lawful as an indirect product tax, there must be a “nexus”
between the border tax and the product to bring the tax within the provisions
of Article II permitting the imposition of border charges.96 This nexus arises
when the carbon tax on imports is directed at leveling the playing field
between like products in the destination jurisdiction.97 If the border tax was
not connected to the domestic regulatory regime, the tax would be classified
as “other duties or charges” under Article II(1)(b) rather than “internal taxes”
under the notwithstanding provision in Article II(2)(a).98
1.

“Like Products” and Excess

The reference to internal taxes in Article II(2)(b) provision is expressly
qualified by reference to the national treatment obligation in Article III(2).
This provides that imported products “shall not be subject, directly or
indirectly, to internal taxes or other internal charges of any kind in excess of
those applied, directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.”99 A similar
test applies in respect to the exemption of exported products from domestic
taxes where those products are destined for a jurisdiction that does not regulate
emissions.100 In Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, the
WTO Appellate Body broke this provision down into qualitative and
quantitative elements.101 First, it is necessary to determine whether the
94

Id. art. II(2)(a).
de Cendra, supra note 89, at 138.
96
Christine Kaufmann & Rolf H. Weber, Carbon-Related Border Tax Adjustment: Mitigating Climate
Change or Restricting International Trade?, 10 WORLD TRADE REV. 497, 520 (2011).
97
Id. at 520.
98
de Cendra, supra note 89, at 141 (“The distinction between them is that duties and charges apply
exclusively to imported products without being related in any way to similar charges collected internally on
like domestic products.”).
99
GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2).
100
Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures, Annex 1A, Apr. 15, 1994, 1869 U.N.T.S. 14; THE LEGAL TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF
THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 229 (1999) (“[T]he exemption of an
exported product from duties or taxes borne by the like product when destined for domestic consumption, or
the remission of such duties or taxes in amounts not in excess of those which have accrued, shall not be
deemed to be a subsidy.”).
101
Appellate Body Report, Canada – Certain Measures Concerning Periodicals, WTO Doc.
WT/DS31/AB/R (adopted Jul. 30, 1997); see also Appellate Body Report, European Communities –
95
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imported and domestic products are “like” products. If so, it is then necessary
to examine the quantitative question of whether the internal tax on imported
products exceeds the tax on domestic products.
The first of the Periodicals elements—whether the products are “like”
—poses the biggest hurdle to a lawful CRBTA. The extent to which the
determination of likeness can take into account processes and production
methods remains unclear in WTO jurisprudence. In particular, it is not clear
whether different processes and production methods—whether incorporated
into the final product or not—enable products to be treated differently (i.e. as
unlike products).102 Nevertheless, it is possible to undertake an assessment of
the parameters and considerations that factor into a determination on the
question of likeness.
The WTO Appellate Body has compared the “likeness” criterion to an
“accordion” which “stretches and squeezes in different places as different
provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied.”103 This indicates the
contextual nature of the likeness assessment, which varies according to the
circumstances of each case.104 The initial guidance of the WTO’s working
party on BTAs recognized the issue as one to be determined in each case,
turning on criteria including: the end uses of a product in a given market;
consumers’ tastes and habits; and the properties, nature, and quality of the
product.105 A related approach is to assess “likeness” according to the degree
of product substitutability in a competitive market.106 This accords with the
overarching purpose of Article III(2), which is to require “equality of
competitive conditions for imported products in relation to domestic
products.”107 The “conditions of competition” were a fundamental feature of
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos Containing Products, WTO Doc. WT/DS135/AB/R (adopted
Mar. 12, 2001).
102
Kaufmann & Weber, supra note 96, at 520.
103
Appellate Body Report, Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, 21, WTO Doc. WT/DS8/AB/R,
WT/DS10/AB/R, WT/DS11/AB/R (adopted Oct. 4, 1996) [hereinafter Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic
Beverages].
104
William J. Davey & Joost Pauwelyn, MFN-Unconditionality: A Legal Analysis of the Concept in
View of Its Evolution in the GATT/WTO Jurisprudence with Particular Reference of the Issue of “Like
Product”, in REGULATORY BARRIERS AND THE PRINCIPLE OF NON-DISCRIMINATION IN THE WORLD TRADE
LAW: PAST, PRESENT, AND FUTURE 13, 25–36 (Thomas Cottier & Petros C. Mavroidis eds., 2000); see also
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 103, at 21 (“The accordion of ‘likeness’ stretches and
squeezes in different places different provisions of the WTO Agreement are applied.”).
105
Report by the Working Party on Border Tax Adjustments, supra note 84, ¶ 18.
106
KOMMERSKOLLEGIUM, CLIMATE MEASURES AND TRADE, LEGAL AND ECONOMIC ASPECTS OF
BORDER CARBON ADJUSTMENTS 12 (2009).
107
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 103, at 16–17.
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the decision of the WTO Appellate Body in the Korea – Beef case, finding
that a measure modifying the conditions of competition in the relevant market
amounted to less favorable treatment if it detrimentally affected imported
products.108
The second Periodicals element is a quantitative assessment of whether
the border tax adjustment on imported products is “in excess” of the internal
tax for like domestic products. The threshold of “excess” is an absolute one,
meaning “even the smallest amount of ‘excess’ is too much” and enough to
render the measure unlawful.109 The strict restriction on the application of
excess taxation has important design implications for a national government,
requiring considerable caution when setting a BTA.110
2.

Process and Production Methods

Article II(2)(a) permits the levying of taxes on any “article from which
the imported product has been manufactured or produced in whole or in
part.”111 This raises the possibility of levying taxes referable to the energy
used in the production process of an imported product,112 a matter of
importance to the possible scope of a CRBTA. However, a BTA related to
production processes must accord with the national treatment requirement in
Article III(2), which prohibits the application of any internal taxes, directly or
indirectly, to imports in excess of those applied, directly or indirectly, to like
domestic products.113 A challenge arises in the application of Article III(2) in
the context of taxes referable to the processes and production methods of an
imported product, as opposed to the product itself.114

108
Appellate Body Report, Korea – Measures Affecting Imports of Fresh, Chilled and Frozen Beef, ¶¶
137–44, WTO Doc. WT/DS169/AB/R, WT/DS161/AB/R (adopted Dec. 11, 2000) [hereinafter Korea –
Beef].
109
Japan – Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, supra note 103, at 23.
110
Weber, supra note 1, at 412 (“ . . . [A] national government should be cautious when determining
the amount of the BTA, taking particular care of avoid levying a higher carbon tax on imported products than
on domestic ones.”).
111
GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2)(a).
112
See, e.g., Demaret & Stewardson, supra note 83, at 18–20; Frank Biermann & Rainer Brohm,
Border Adjustments on Energy Taxes: A Possible Tool for European Policymakers in Implementing the Kyoto
Protocol?, 74 VIETRELJAHRSHEFTE ZUR WIRTSCHAFTSFARSCHUNG 249 (2005).
113
GATT, supra note 93, art. III(2).
114
See, e.g., Charles E. McLure, Jr., A Primer on the Legality of Border Adjustments for Carbon Prices:
Through a GATT Darkly, 4 CARBON & CLIMATE L. REV. 456, 460 (2011).
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A distinction can be drawn between processes of product that are
incorporated into a final product and those that are not.115 The U.S. Superfund
case concerned the imposition of a tax on imported substances produced or
manufactured using certain regulated chemicals.116 The BTA was set equal
to the amount of domestic tax that would have been imposed on the
incorporated chemicals in the domestic market.117 The GATT Panel allowed
the application of border adjustment on ingredients physically incorporated
into the manufactured substances.118 Of course, in this case, the chemicals
constituted part of the chemical composition of the imported product. The
application of BTAs referable to energy used in the manufacture of an
imported product, but not forming part of the product itself, is the subject of
academic controversy and remains unresolved in WTO jurisprudence.119
Kaufmann and Weber argue that the application of a BTA associated
with energy consumption used in making a product is “questionable.”120 They
correctly observe that a BTA can only be applied to products.121 This must
be so—an importing state has no jurisdiction to tax processes or methods of
production in another state directly. They also observe, again correctly, that
the application of a BTA requires an existing domestic tax. These two
features, they argue, mean that “charges on imports which are not related to a
domestic tax are not BTA under WTO law, and taxes which are not applied
to products are not border-adjustable.”122
However, there is no reason, in principle or in the text of Article III(2),
to preclude the application of an adjustment referable to energy used in the
manufacture of an imported product. Article III(2) includes taxes “applied,
directly or indirectly, to like domestic products.” The reference to “indirectly”
refers to taxes that are not applied to the products themselves but are
associated with the product.123 That a BTA must be applied to a product is of
no moment. Article III(2) does not require the application of like taxes; it
115
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simply provides that imported products should not be subject to internal taxes
exceeding those applied to like domestic products. So, while Article III(2)
requires an existing domestic tax, it is the burden of the tax, rather than its
form, that is legally significant.
The text of Article III(2) does not prevent an importing country from
applying a tax directly to an imported good representing the differential in
production cost arising from taxes indirectly applied to like domestic goods
through the taxation of energy used in their production and that are not
imposed in exporting country. Article III(2) only requires that the burden of
the tax on the imported product not exceed the burden on like domestic
products.124 This is consistent with the purpose of Article III(2), which is to
permit the equalization of regulation regimes across jurisdictions so that no
product has a competitive advantage simply because the exporting state does
not regulate. Article III(2) relates to all taxes that might affect the
competitiveness of a product. Accordingly, it is consistent with the text of
Article III(2) and its purpose to include taxes on inputs to production, whether
or not those inputs are directly incorporated into the product itself.
Nevertheless, the issue remains controversial in WTO jurisprudence and it is
difficult to predict how the question will ultimately be resolved.125
3.

Prohibition on Protection of Domestic Production

Finally, Article III(2) prevents states from applying internal taxes or
charges to imported or domestic products in a manner contrary to Article
III(1).126 Article III(1) contains a general prohibition on protectionist internal
regulation, providing that domestic taxes and regulations should not be
applied so as to “afford protection to domestic production.”127 In short, a BTA
on an imported product must be equivalent to an internal tax on a like domestic
product, and it must comply with the national treatment principle contained in
Article III.
C.

Non-Discrimination / Most Favored Nation

A BTA on an imported product must not offend the most favored nation
principle embodied in Article I(1). Under Article I(1), “any advantage,
124
125
126
127
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Weber, supra note 1, at 414.
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favour, privilege or immunity” granted to any party “shall be accorded
immediately and unconditionally to the like product originating in or destined
for” all other parties.128 This principle requires a state to accord like privileges
to any product originating in its state or destined for another state to like
products originating in or destined for any other state.129
The most favored nation principle ought not to be problematic for a
CRBTA, which distinguishes on the basis of a state’s regulation of greenhouse
gas emissions rather than the national origin of the product.130 However, the
WTO Appellate Body has taken a broad interpretation of Article I(1),
prohibiting both de jure and de facto discrimination where measures do not
on their face appear to discriminate on the basis of national origin.131 On this
basis, Kaufmann and Weber argue that CRBTAs might be subject to challenge
on the ground that they involve de facto discrimination on the grounds of
national origin.132 They give the example of imposing measures on imports
from a specific WTO member with carbon-intensive production methods.133
The targeting of a measure against a specific party creates problems despite
an ostensible environmental justification.
At first blush, a prohibition on de facto discrimination appears to be a
significant hurdle for the application of CRBTAs against recalcitrant parties
to the Paris Agreement. Such measures would be based on climate policy
rather than national origin, but by targeting a specific state, they could give
rise to allegations of discrimination. Ultimately, any contest about whether a
BTA amounts to de facto discrimination on the basis of national origin will
depend on the evidence in the particular case. It is likely to be easier to
establish the legitimacy of a measure where it has a close nexus to conduct
referable to obligations under the Paris Agreement or the measure exempts
foreign producers that are taking appropriate action to reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, even if their state is not. The UNFCCC and the GATT arguably
point in the same direction.134 Article 3.5 of the UNFCCC prohibits climate
change measures that “constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable
128
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discrimination or a disguised restriction on international trade.” This aligns
with the prohibition on discrimination in GATT and highlights the need for
justification and rationality of any trade measures imposed in furtherance of
climate action.
D.

Justifications

The GATT provides a series of grounds that enable a state to justify
trade measures that otherwise violate the provision of the Agreement.135
These are exhaustively set out in Article XX. Two have particular relevance
to environmental measures. Article XX(b) provides an exception for
measures “necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health.”136
Article XX(g) excludes measures “relating to the conservation of exhaustible
natural resources if such measures are made effective in conjunction with
restrictions on domestic production or consumption.” These exceptions have
been used to justify a range of national measures aimed at protecting human
health and the environment, including measures related to the consumption of
cigarettes, asbestos, the accumulation of waste tires, air quality, and the
consumption of both renewable and non-renewable resources.137 The
exceptions also extend to measures-linked production processes in foreign
countries.138
The term “exhaustible natural resources” in Article XX(g) appears to
be narrow and a product of the time of its drafting, when environmental issues
had yet to garner much political salience. However, the WTO Appellate Body
has construed Article XX(g) to have a wide ambit, encompassing both
biological resources and environmental systems. Importantly, it is not limited
to resources traditionally considered to be “non-renewable.”139 The provision
has been extended to cover depletion of stocks of fish, dolphins, and
endangered turtles, which the Appellate Body has determined are no less
exhaustible or finite than traditional non-renewable resources such as

135
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petroleum or iron ore.140 The Appellate Body has taken the provision even
further, holding that “a policy to reduce the depletion of clean air was a policy
to conserve a natural resource within the meaning of Article XX(g).”141 By
extending the provision to encompass clean air as a resource, the Appellate
Body has left the door open to treat the atmospheric system as an exhaustible
natural resource. It is likely that the Appellate Body would apply the
provision in this way, by either treating that atmospheric system as a natural
resource or by focusing on the effects of climate change on specific threatened
plants and animals.142
Article XX(b) is also applicable to justify measures protecting the
environment. The WTO Appellate Body has an expansive interpretation of
the provision, taking it beyond its text that connects it to the protection of
human, animal or plant life or health. In Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, the
Appellate Body held that Article XX(b) extended to the general protection of
the environment.143 It supported this interpretation by reference to the
complexity of environmental problems, which require comprehensive policies
“comprising a multiplicity of interacting measures.”144 Measures to
“attenuate global warming and climate change” were singled out as an
example of a complex regulatory challenge.145 Article XX(b) and (g) are
likely to work in harmony in the context of measures that relate to climate
protection.
The WTO Appellate Body will not scrutinize the policy choices of
states, who retain discretion to determine their own policy goals and
priorities.146 To establish a justification under Article XX, it is necessary for
the state imposing the impugned measure to establish that the measure was
necessary by showing that it was indispensable or proportional. An
indispensable measure is one that provides the only means of achieving a
state’s desired policy objective.147 If other measures could also achieve the
140
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policy objective, the chosen measure can be justified as proportional if no less
restrictive measure is “reasonably available.”148 The measure must be shown
to make an actual contribution to the environmental objective and must not be
overbroad.149 Necessity is a flexible standard—a member gets to choose its
“own level of protection”150—but the threshold will be more readily
demonstrated in respect to objectives of significant value or importance.151
The fundamental role of the climate system for the sustenance of human
existence means it ought to be recognized as an interest of the highest order
of significance. To this end, the WTO Appellate Body ought to allow states
substantial deference when assessing the necessity of measures implemented
in furtherance of climate policy objectives as spelled out in the 2015 Paris
Agreement.
It is also necessary for a state to establish that the measure sought to be
justified accords with the chapeau of Article XX. The chapeau prohibits the
justification of measures that are protectionist, reflecting the core principles
of international trade law.152 This ensures that the exceptions in Article XX
are invoked in good faith, rather than to circumvent the substantive provisions
of the GATT.153 The prevailing approach of the Appellate Body first
considers whether the measure is discriminatory vis-à-vis domestic producers
or other states.154 It then examines whether any identified discrimination is
protectionist by assessing whether it is “arbitrary or unjustifiable” or whether
it amounts to a “disguised restriction on international trade.”155 The Appellate
Body’s assessment is comparative and relative, as the relevant discrimination
is “between countries where the same conditions prevail.”156 In U.S. –
Shrimp, the Appellate Body held that the “same conditions” went further than
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countries governed by the same international treaty regime to the substantive
appropriateness of regulatory measures prevailing in exporting states.157
The Appellate Body in the Brazil – Retreaded Tyres decision set out
the test to be applied to determine whether a measure is “arbitrary or
unjustifiable.” 158 A measure is “arbitrary or unjustifiable” where there is
discrimination and “the reasons given for this discrimination bear no rational
connection to the objective falling within the purview of a paragraph of Article
XX, or would go against that objective.”159 The “no rational connection”
threshold is a high one that will rarely be established where a legitimate policy
is implemented.
Finally, in U.S. – Shrimp, the Appellate Body found that the application
of trade measures by the United States was unjustifiable because the United
States had not negotiated with the complainant countries, but it had negotiated
with other countries.160 The United States had also failed to raise the issue of
turtle conservation in a relevant multilateral environmental agreement forum
and to ratify relevant treaties on turtle conservation.161 The Appellate Body
subsequently reiterated that the complaining states should be given
opportunities to negotiate international agreements “comparable from one
forum of negotiation to the other.”162 The primacy of cooperative action was
also recognized by the Appellate Body in U.S. – Gasoline, which criticized
the United States for failing to pursue cooperative agreements.163 The wide
ratification of the Paris Agreement, and the argument advanced here that
CRBTAs will be linked to recalcitrant states under that agreement, make it
likely that justification will be established.
E.

Towards a Lawful Measure

The preceding analysis demonstrates the contours required for a
CRBTA measure that complies with the requirements of GATT. Such a
measure would equalize the effects of emissions-reduction regulation on like
U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 139, ¶ 165.
Brazil – Retreaded Tyres, supra note 143, ¶ 227.
159
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160
U.S. – Shrimp, supra note 139, ¶ 172.
161
Id. ¶ 171.
162
Appellate Body Report, United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products
– Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by Malaysia, ¶ 122, WTO Doc. WT/DS58/AB/RW (adopted Oct. 22,
2001).
163
Efforts to negotiate were required but they did not need to be successful. See U.S. – Gasoline, supra
note 141, at 27–28.
157
158

636

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 3

products between trading partners. Any discrimination would need to be
justified on the basis of different levels of emissions regulation rather than
national origin. If compliance issues arose under the national treatment or
non-discrimination provisions of GATT, a CRBTA could be saved by
application of the exception in Article XX if it was transparent and followed
best regulatory practices and standards.164 The legality of any particular
CRBTA measure would ultimately depend on assessment under WTO
adjudication, but, as Hufbauer has observed, “[Appellate Body] rulings in
previous cases . . . show considerable sympathy with environmental concerns
and have increased the likelihood that trade restrictions in furtherance of GHG
emissions controls would pass muster under WTO rules.”165
The greatest challenge to designing a CRBTA regime is the “devilishly
complicated” task of practical design and implementation,166 issues that are
beyond the scope of this article. The regime must account accurately for the
differential treatment of emissions embodied in, or referable to, different
products. Accurately identifying the level of emissions associated with
different products can be challenging, and any assessment may be subject to
challenge. The final Part of this Article addresses how CRBTAs can be used
to complement the multilateral regime established by the Paris Agreement.
IV.

MAKING CRBTAS A REALITY: THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL
ECONOMY GLOBAL CLIMATE GOVERNANCE AFTER THE PARIS
AGREEMENT

This Article began with the observation that there is a disconnect
between the academic case for CRBTAs in support of unilateral climate
change action and the absence of any example of such measures being
deployed. One possible explanation is that states remain unsure of the legality
of such measures and do not want to risk an adverse determination upon
164
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challenge, or states may be unable to overcome practical challenges involved
in the design of a lawful CRBTA. The disconnect might also be explained by
the relatively small number of states that unilaterally have placed meaningful
regulations on a significant proportion of their domestic greenhouse gas
emissions.
The most plausible explanation, however, is political.
The
implementation of a unilateral BTA is likely to be poorly received by domestic
interests within a trading partner state.167 A BTA that is seen as illegitimate
may provoke trade retaliation or legal challenge. The European Union bought
such a fight when it enacted a directive requiring international commercial
aviation arriving at or departing from an EU airport to meet obligations under
its emissions trading system.168 The EU’s controversial leadership in the face
of then-stagnant negotiations on international aviation emissions provoked a
“chorus of complaints.”169 Retaliation was swift. Both China and the United
States took domestic steps to allow their airlines to disregard the EU
requirements, and China reacted directly by freezing an order to purchase an
Airbus A330 aircraft estimated to be worth USD $6 billion.170 In the face of
pressure, the EU ultimately chose to suspend its aviation directive.171
What reason is there to believe that political life can be breathed into a
proposal to use CRBTAs to complement the enforcement provisions of the
Paris Agreement? This Article argues that there are three reasons to believe
that the use of CRBTAs against recalcitrant parties to the Paris Agreement is
167
Initial proposals by the European Parliament (resolutions 2005/2049) to deploy “border adjustment
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likely to become politically feasible in the near future. First, the Paris
Agreement represents a paradigm shift in the international status quo. Having
broken through the “firewall” of the Kyoto Protocol, new political dynamics
are emerging in the climate governance field that wield significant economic
might. Second, the CRBTAs proposed in this Article are linked to the Paris
Agreement. Associating CRBTAs with a multilateral agreement, rather than
unilateral climate action, changes the dynamics of implementation. Finally,
there has been a demonstrable shift in the international political discourse
following the election of President Trump in the United States. President
Trump’s announcement of the United States’ withdrawal from the Paris
Agreement, the reduction of emissions mitigation policies, and the expansion
of emitting activities have been met by international calls to utilize trade
measures to maintain the integrity of the global climate governance project.172
A.

A Paradigm Shift at Paris?

The wide participation in the Paris Agreement173 appears to signal a
new paradigm of international climate governance. Most significantly, the
Agreement broke down the “firewall” of hard differentiation established by
the Kyoto Protocol. Under the Paris Agreement, developing and developed
countries alike have pledged to work toward increasingly ambitious
quantitative goals of emissions reduction. It is a mark of the unique design of
the Paris Agreement that the developing world has taken on a truly active role
in the global climate mitigation project without needing to disavow its claims
of differential responsibility and capability. China has emerged as the head
of this new non-Annex 1 presence and its contribution to the success of the
Paris conference signals its active and constructive participation in
multilateral international climate governance as the “new normal.”174
Importantly, the Paris Agreement represents a model that has been able
to “better align international climate policy with the realities of international
climate politics.”175 It deftly avoided the roadblocks that had plagued
172
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international climate negotiations—legal bindingness and equitable burden
sharing—while producing a well-subscribed agreement pointing in a positive
direction.176 It is, of course, far too early to assess whether the Paris
Agreement has resulted in a new paradigm. It is unlikely that a single
international conference or agreement can produce a paradigm shift.177
Nevertheless, the Agreement has caused a directional shift178 that builds on
and continues a “new logic” of international climate politics focused on
domestic action and international transparency.179
The lack of political cohesiveness has been a major argument against
CRBTAs.180 However, the “new logic” of international climate politics has
the potential to project a new political cohesiveness in favor of the
international climate governance project. The legitimacy of the Paris
regime—evidenced by significant state buy-in, particularly from major
emitters and the developing world—emboldens the cooperation of states with
a shared objective of emissions reduction. 181 This political cohesiveness
provides the foundation for the use of CRBTAs against recalcitrant parties.
The Paris Agreement provides a new psychological status quo, making
departures more challenging to justify.182
The risk remains that states with major economies would follow a major
economic power—like the United States—out of the Agreement, or that a
CRBTA would prove to be illusory in its ability to alter the behavior of a
recalcitrant state. After all, who has sufficient power to enforce a border tax
adjustment, especially in the face of a major economic power (such as the
United States or China) that simply refuses to pay?183 The political power
derived from the broad consensus reached at Paris provides the answer. Of
course, the effective implementation of a CRBTA measure in support of the
Paris Agreement will rely on the political consensus established at Paris
surviving the delinquency of major players like the United States or China.
176
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The argument here is that the new logic of international climate politics means
it is now more likely than ever that the international climate governance
project could survive a major defection. The same cooperative foundations
underlying the Paris Agreement can be used to coordinate a trade-based
response towards a recalcitrant party.
B.

The Multilateral Context

A key feature of post-Paris international climate politics is a
reinvigoration of the multilateral environment. This Article’s proposal to link
a CRBTA to a multilateral regime in the form of the Paris Agreement
distinguishes it from traditional CRBTA proposals that are usually deployed
to support unilateral action. To date, states have been unwilling to enact
unilateral CRBTAs, appearing to view the potential costs of retaliation as
greater than the trade effects of differential climate policy. Situating the
measure alongside a multilateral agreement enables parties to coordinate more
easily the implementation of CRBTAs and provides a baseline for when a
CRBTA should be employed.
Two benefits emerge by situating CRBTAs in a context in which states
are more likely and able to act in concert. First, states are able to mitigate the
risk of retaliation by acting as an economic bloc. This minimizes the risk of
retaliation against any particular state and increases the likelihood that a
recalcitrant state subject to a set of CRBTAs will either accept the imposition
of the CRBTA or alter its behavior to return to the Paris framework. In this
sense, the link between CRBTAs and the Paris Agreement resembles the idea
of “coalitions of the willing” or “climate clubs” that have been proposed as a
means to support multinational emissions reduction and technology
transfer.184
Second, the multilateral setting provides a check on determining
whether a state is truly recalcitrant or merely underperforming. CRBTAs are
not to be used against states that are failing to meet their NDCs through a lack
of capability or a lack of ambition.185 Those circumstances are within the
184
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contemplation of the Paris regime and can be addressed through its
mechanisms of facilitative assistance and political or moral suasion. It is not
appropriate for parties to use CRBTAs in circumstances that would
undermine, rather than complement, the Paris regime. The unwillingness of
states to impose unilateral CRBTAs provides a natural check on overuse. It
is anticipated that a critical mass of states will need to be willing to impose a
CRBTA before such a measure becomes politically and economically
feasible. To establish this critical mass, it will be necessary for a bloc of states
to come to the conclusion that a targeted state is recalcitrant rather than simply
underperforming. The need for collective action to implement an effective
regime of CRBTA measures ensures that there is a link between a genuine
community assessment of the targeted party and the measure used.
C.

International Reaction to President Trump

Support for a new role for CRBTAs in connection with multilateral
efforts to reduce greenhouse gas emissions can be found in the international
response to the rhetoric and policies of the new President of the United States.
The United States has something of a dubious history in international climate
change negotiations.186 A charitable view of the Paris Agreement could offer
a narrative of a renewed United States leadership (under the Obama
Administration) in the international climate arena. A more cynical view could
query whether the Agreement was instead a reflection of “two decades of
obstruction by the US, using its power (and constrained by its domestic
political circumstances) to undermine alternatives and drive other parties to
an acceptance of its preferences and requirements.”187 Regardless of
motivation, the change in the direction of the United States’ domestic and
international climate policy under the leadership of President Obama was
significant, including the promulgation of the Clean Power Plan designed to
substantially reduce energy emissions.
The election of President Trump in November 2016 appears to signal a
return to United States indifference or obstructionism in the global effort to
Differential and More Favorable Treatment, Reciprocity and Fuller Participation of Developing Countries,
L/4903 (Nov. 28, 1979), GATT BISD (26th Supp.), at 191 (1980).
186
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mitigate greenhouse gas emissions. President Trump ran on a platform that
pledged to withdraw the United States from the Paris Agreement, revoke the
Clean Power Plan, reinvigorate heavy industry and fossil fuel extraction, and
reduce funding to the Environmental Protection Agency.188 Early in his term,
President Trump promulgated an executive order unwinding or revising many
of the climate change policies of his predecessor, including the Clean Power
Plan, seeking to revive the United States coal industry.189 Delays to, or
abandonment of, the United States mitigation pledges will make it unlikely
that the overall objectives of the Paris Agreement can be achieved.190 So far,
this appears to be the course signaled by the United States—as noted, the
United States delegation at COP23 pushed a fossil fuel agenda inconsistent
with the principles and spirit of the Paris Agreement.
The international response to the Trump Administration’s climate
change proposals has been swift. Chinese President Xi Jinping has implored
the United States to remain true to the “hard-won achievement” of the Paris
Agreement.191 The talk of many of the United States’ traditional allies—and
major trading partners—has been more fighting. Rodolfo Lacy, Mexico’s
Undersecretary of Planning and Environmental Policy and Planning,
acknowledged the possibility of a “carbon tariff” against the United States in
order to “protect our environment and to protect our industries.”192 Former
French President Nicolas Sarkozy has called on Europe to impose a one to
three percent tax on American imports if the United States withdraws from
188
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the Paris Agreement.193 Similar sentiments have been echoed by nongovernmental organizations194 and private sector actors.195
The explicit reference to trade measures by actors within two of the
United States’ major trading partners (Mexico and the European Union)
should not be dismissed as mere political rhetoric. It is possible that the
statements are a credible signal of a shift in the new international climate
politics paradigm following the Paris Agreement to a position that is not
willing to tolerate United States recalcitrance. President Trump has taken a
hostile stance on trade with Mexico, China, and Europe, which may add fuel
to the fire of arguments in favor of the use CRBTAs in support of the Paris
Agreement.196 The Trump Administration should be wary of the possibility
of CRBTAs, given that the United States appears to be challenging, or at least
disengaging with, the global climate change project it agreed to at Paris.
Of course, it is not only the United States that should be wary of trade
repercussions associated with its climate change policies—though at the time
of writing it appears to be the only party overtly signaling the intent to step
back from the Paris Agreement. It may be that the United States holds the
course—although that seems unlikely at the time of writing—and that,
instead, another major emitter like China or India seeks to deviate. In that
case, the United States might be expected to lead the international charge to
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implement a CRBTA given the popularity of trade measures in domestic
political discourse around climate change policy.
V.

CONCLUSION

This Article has argued that it is possible for states to develop and
implement a CRBTA measure that complies with the provisions of the GATT,
and that such a measure can be used to support the international climate
governance regime created by the Paris Agreement. A CRBTA provides a
harder edge to the moral and political suasion envisioned by the Paris
Agreement without fundamentally departing from its underlying premise of
self-determined common but differentiated responsibilities. It is important to
reiterate that it is only envisaged that CRBTAs would be used against truly
recalcitrant parties, those willfully failing to implement the domestic policies
needed to achieve their NDCs. It would not be consistent with the Paris
framework for trade measures to be used against parties that are struggling to
achieve their goals as a result of a lack of capacity, or even those states that
should simply be trying harder and doing better. The proposed use of trade
measures would be rare. The need for a CRBTA to be adopted by a large
number of parties in order to be effective acts as a natural check on their
overuse.
The actions of the Trump Administration in the United States might
provide an early opportunity for CRBTAs to be deployed in support of the
Paris Agreement. President Trump campaigned on a platform that included
renouncing the United States’ obligations under the Paris Agreement and his
administration has followed through on that pledge. While the limitations on
withdrawal in the terms of the Paris Agreement might act as constraints on
formal withdrawal from the Agreement, the United States might still be
viewed as a recalcitrant party if it uses national policies to walk back its NDC
or acts to undermine international processes. The actions of the United States,
in the context of the “thick consensus” embodied in the Paris Agreement, have
the potential to provide the first opportunity for states to deploy trade
measures in support of the Paris Agreement.

